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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Both games and game forms- the latter being ‘games without preferences’ i.e.
models of pure interaction structures— come in a large variety of formats. In
fact, this is clearly the case even when only the most commonly used extensive,
strategic and coalitional formats are considered, and some more exotic variants
are ignored. This circumstance immediately raises the following question: does
there exist any available mathematical structure which happens to be general
enough to accommodate —i.e. to specialize to— game forms and games of each
‘basic’ format as mentioned above?
Since games and game forms are typically described in common, informal
set-theoretic language, the category Set of sets and functions is a ﬁrst obvious
candidate. Another, perhaps more interesting, possibility is provided by certain
categories of Chu spaces. Chu spaces may be regarded as abstract representa-
tions of classiﬁcations of certain classes of ‘objects’ in terms of certain classes
of ‘types’: indeed it has been explicitly suggested that the universe of games
essentially amounts to the category Chu(Set,2) (see e.g. Lafont and Stre-
icher (1991) and Pratt (1995)). Moreover, Pratt shows that virtually all known
mathematical structures admit a full embedding into Chu(Set,K) for some set
K. However, under the implied standard representation of games as objects
of Chu(Set,2), only 2-player strictly competitive games in strategic form, an
extremely specialized class of games, are covered. Therefore, it remains to be
seen whether categories other than Set exist that include all the basic game for-
mats as subcategories of theirs. In that connection, we focus on the categories
Chu(Poset,K) for some set K,w h e r ePoset denotes the category of partially
ordered sets and order-homomorphisms.The present note is mainly devoted to
the task of showing the following two points:
i) if game-forms-as-objects (or games-as-objects) are considered while mor-
phisms are essentially ignored, then each one of the main game-theoretic for-
mats with their basic variants may be represented either as a (discrete) non-
full subcategory of Chu(Poset,2) or as a (discrete) concrete category over
Chu(Poset,2);
ii) moreover, for a suitable choice of morphisms the resulting category Ecgf
∗
of coalitional game forms turns out to be a full subcategory of Chu(Poset,2).
Some consequences of points i) and ii) concerning the ‘universality’ of games
as objects of mathematical discourse are also discussed.
2 Some basic categorical preliminaries
Categories provide the most natural setting for any attempt at classifying and
comparing several game formats. We introduce for the sake of completeness a
few basic categorical deﬁnitions and facts we shall need in the ensuing treat-
ment of game-theoretic notions (see e.g. Adámek, Herrlich, Strecker(1990) for
a thorough introduction to category theory).
A category is a tuple C =( O,hom,id,◦) whereO = Ob(C) is a class that denotes the objects of C
hom : O×O→ U -w h e r eU denotes the universe, i.e. the class of all sets-
is a function that maps each pair (A,B) of objects into a set homC(A,B),t h e
set of C-morphisms from A to B
id : O → Mor(C) -w h e r eMor(C)=
S
A,B∈O homC (A,B)- is a function
that maps each object A into idA ∈ hom(A,A),t h eidentity-morphism on A
◦ : Mor(C) × Mor(C)  M o r (C) is a partial binary operation on mor-
phisms -composition- that maps each pair of morphisms f ∈ homC(A,B),g ∈
homC(C,D) such that B = C into a morphism g ◦ f ∈ homC(A,D)
and the following conditions are satisﬁed:
Cat1) (Associativity of ◦): h◦(g ◦f)=( h◦g)◦f whenever both g ◦f and
h ◦ g are deﬁned
Cat2) (Identity): for any A,B ∈ O and for each f ∈ homC(A,B), f◦idA = f
and idB ◦ f = f
Cat3) (Hom-Disjointness): for any A,B,C,D ∈ O,i f(A,B) 6=( C,D) then
homC(A,B) ∩ homC(C,D)=∅.
In particular, for any class Y a category C(Y ) induced by Y can be deﬁned by
positing Ob(C(Y )) = Y,homC(Y )(y,y)={y} for any y ∈ Y and homC(Y )(x,y)=
∅ for any x,y ∈ Y such that x 6= y,idy = y for any y ∈ Y, and y ◦ y = y for any
y ∈ Y.
A category C =( O,hom,id,◦) is discrete if for any morphism f ∈ Mor(C)
there exists an object A ∈ O such that f = idA. Discrete categories essentially
amount to class-induced categories as deﬁned above.
A source in a category A is a pair S =(A,(fi)i∈I) where A ∈ Ob(A),I is a
class and for all i ∈ I there exists Ai ∈ Ob(A) such that fi ∈ homA(A,Ai):A
is also called the domain of the source and the family (Ai)i∈I its codomain.
A product in a category A is a source P =( A,(pi)i∈I) such that for every
source S =(A,(fi)i∈I) in A having the same domain as P there exists a unique
morphism f ∈ homA(A,P) with fi = pi ◦ f for each i ∈ I. A product P
with codomain (Ai)i∈I is also called a product of the family (Ai)i∈I. Ap r o d u c t
P =( A,(pi)i∈I) is a ﬁnite product if I is a ﬁnite set. Similarly, products
of morphisms can be deﬁned relying on products of objects as deﬁned above.





i∈I Bi,(pi)i∈I) products of the families of objects
(Ai)i∈I and (Bi)i∈I, respectively. Then, the product of the family (fi)i∈I of
A-morphisms is the unique morphism
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i∈I fi) ◦ pj = fj ◦ πj for each j ∈ I.
A category A has (ﬁnite) products if for every (ﬁnite) set-indexed family
(Ai)i∈I with Ai ∈ Ob(A) for each i ∈ I there exists in A ap r o d u c tP -also
denoted (
Q
i Ai,(pi)i∈I)- with codomain (Ai)i∈I.
A functor from category A to category B -also denoted F : A → B-i sa
function
F : Ob(A)∪Mor(A) →Ob(B) ∪ Mor(B)
such that for any A,B,C,D ∈ Ob(A) and any f ∈ homA(A,B),g∈ homA(C,D)
F1)F(A) ∈ Ob(B), F2)F(f) ∈ homB(F(A),F(B)),F 3 ) F(g ◦ f)=F(g) ◦
F(f) whenever g ◦ f is deﬁned, i.e. whenever B = C,F 4 )F(idA)=idF(A).Let A,B be categories. A functor F : A → B is an embedding if F¹Mor(A) :
Mor(A) →Mor(B) is an injective function, and is faithful if for any A,A0 ∈
Ob(A),F ¹homA(A,A0) :h o m A(A,A0) → homB(F(A),F(A0)) is an injective func-
tion.
Hence, F is an embedding if and only if F is faithful and F¹Ob(A) : Ob(A) →Ob(B)
is an injective function. Moreover, F is full if for any A,A0 ∈ Ob(A),F ¹homA(A,A0) :
homA(A,A0) → homB(F(A),F(A0)) is a surjective function, and an isomor-
phism if it is faithful, full and F¹Ob(A) : Ob(A) →Ob(B) is a bijective function.
Two categories A,B are isomorphic if there exists a functor F : A → B that is
an isomorphism.
A category B is a subcategory of a category A if the following conditions
are satisﬁed: a) Ob(B) ⊆ Ob(A);b) for any B,B0 ∈ Ob(B), homB(B,B0) ⊆
homA(B,B0);c) for any B ∈ Ob(B),id B(A)=idB(B);d )◦B = ◦A¹Mor(B).
Moreover, B is a full subcategory of A if it is a subcategory of A and homB(B,B0)=
homA(B,B0) for all B,B0 ∈ Ob(B).
If B is a subcategory of A then an inclusion functor I : B → A can be
deﬁned in a natural way by positing I(B)=B and I(f)=f for any B ∈ Ob(B)
and any f ∈ Mor(B).Clearly enough, an inclusion functor is an embedding.
Moreover, the inclusion functor I : B → A is a full embedding if and only if B
is a full subcategory of A: then, B is also said to be fully embeddable into A
i.e. equivalently B is isomorphic to a subcategory of A.
If A is a category, a concrete category over A -the base category- is a pair
(B,U) where B is a category and U : B → A is a faithful functor, the so-called
underlying -or forgetful- functor.
3G a m e f o r m a t s
As mentioned above, game forms and games are to be distinguished: game
forms represent ‘pure’ interaction structures with no reference whatsoever to
the players’ preferences (or revealed preferences) on the outcomes, while games
include information about the latter. Both game forms and games as currently
used in the game-theoretic literature come in a large variety of formats. We
shall focus on the following basic variants:
i) extensive formats: actions or moves available to players and coalition of
players, and admissible sequences of moves are explicitly described to the eﬀect
of providing a dynamic structure of sorts;
ii) strategic formats: action plans available to players and coalitions of play-
ers as well as outcomes resulting from admissible proﬁles of action plans are
described;
iii) coalitional formats: the set of outcome-subsets any player or coalition of
players is able to enforce is described while the relevant actions or action plans
are simply ignored.
Let us then consider the foregoing formats in more detail.3.1 Extensive formats
In what follows, I shall implicitly focus on game forms and games without chance
moves. As a matter of fact, their counterparts with chance moves could be easily
accommodated within the ensuing analytical framework at the sole cost of some
notational complexiﬁcation: therefore, they are simply disregarded here with no
essential loss of generality.
To begin with, let us introduce the following:
Deﬁnition 1 A multi-extensive game form with labelled moves, exits and al-
most perfect information (megflea)is a tuple
Γ =(N,X,(Ai)i∈N,P,v,e,ξ,h)
where
N is a set, that denotes the set of players
X is a set, that denotes the outcome set
(Ai)i∈N is a family -or proﬁle- of sets, where Ai denotes the set of labels of
possible moves of player i, for any i ∈ N
P ⊆ A≤ω is a set of sequences on A such that for each i ∈ N and each
a∗






i∈S Ai , A∗ denotes the set of all lists -or ﬁnite sequences-
on A, Aωdenotes the set of all streams -or inﬁnite sequences- on A,a n dA≤ω =
A∗ ∪ Aω):P denotes the set of all admissible positions or move-paths
v=v0
¹Pwhere v0is the preﬁx partial order on A≤ω (i.e. for any π,π0 ∈
A≤ω, π v π0 iﬀ there exists α ∈ A≤ω such that π0 = π ∗ α where ‘∗’ denotes
concatenation)
e = ∅ is the empty sequence on A, that denotes the initial position
ξ : N P\((P ∩Aω)∪maxv P) is a partial function that maps players into
non-terminal positions i.e. list-positions which are not v-maximal, and denotes
the exit function
h : P Xis a surjective partial function with domain dom(h)=( ( P ∩
Aω)∪maxv P )∪ξ(N) that maps terminal positions PT =( ( P ∩Aω)∪maxv P
i.e. stream-positions and maximal positions of (P,v) and the exit-positions
ξ(N) onto X, in such a way that h(PT)∩h(ξ(N)) = ∅,and denotes the outcome
function,
and the following ‘connectedness’ condition holds
(*) P is an order ideal of poset (A≤ω,v) i.e. for any π,π0 ∈ A≤ω, π ∈ P
and π0 v π entail π0 ∈ P, hence in particular e ∈ P,w h e r ee -the initial position
of Γ-d e n o t e st h eempty sequence on A, i.e. the minimum or bottom element
of (A≤ω,v).
The salient features of a megf lea are i) multiplicity i.e. diﬀerent players
or coalitions may be enabled to move at the same position, ii) move-labelling
i.e. the available moves of each player are explicitly labelled, and to a lesser
extent iii) possible early exits as represented by the exit function and iv) al-
most perfect information i.e. players observe and recall previous moves but
simultaneous -possibly agreed upon- moves are also admissible. Indeed, multi-
plicity can be signiﬁcant and helpful when some notion of parallel compositionof diﬀerent game forms or games is to be considered. Move-labelling licences a
distinction between history-independent and history-dependent strategies. The
possibility of early individual exits accommodates -inter alia- overlapping gen-
erations modelling. By contrast, almost perfect information is to be regarded
essentially as a modelling convenience.
Generally speaking, megf leas have been rarely studied or indeed evoked in
the extant game-theoretic literature (but see Abramsky and Jagadeesan (1994)
that provides a short discussion of 2-person strictly competitive games in multi-
extensive form with labelled moves and perfect information; in that connection,
see also Hyland (1997)). Little more study has been devoted to unlabelled-move
counterparts of megf las, as described by the following
Deﬁnition 2 A multi-extensive game form with unlabelled moves,exits and
almost perfect information (megfuea) is a tuple
Γ =( N,X,P,≤,p 0,λ,ξ,h)
where
N is a set, that denotes the set of players
X is a set, that denotes the outcome set
P is a set, that denotes the set of positions
≤ is an order-i.e. an antisymmetric reﬂexive and transitive binary relation-
on P with a minimum or bottom element, and denotes the predecessor-relationship
between positions
p0 is the minimum of poset (P,≤), that denotes the initial position
λ : P\PT →→ ℘(N) wherePT = {p ∈ P :# {q ∈ P : q ≤ p} ≥ ω}
S
max≤ P
is a correspondence that maps non-terminal positions(i.e.non-maximal posi-
tions having a ﬁnite number of ≤-predecessors ) of (P,≤) into coalitions of play-
ers, and denotes the move-assignment rule that speciﬁes -for each non-terminal
position- those coalitions which are allowed to move
ξ : N P\ PT is a partial function that maps players into non-terminal
positions and denotes the exit function
h : P X is a surjective partial function with dom(P)=PT ∪ ξ(N) that
maps the set PT of terminal positions of (P,≤) -i.e. positions having inﬁnite
≤-predecessors or ≤-maximal positions- and the exit-positions ξ(N) onto X ,
in such a way that h(PT) ∩ h(ξ(N)) = ∅, and denotes the outcome function.
Under megf uea the possibility to distinguish in a natural way between
history-dependent and history-independent strategies is lost. However, megf uea
allow intersections between previously diverging sequences of positions. Hence,
they accommodate as a special case so-called cyclic extensive game forms (see
e.g. Selten,Wooders(2001)).
By contrast, the typical examples of extensive formats one meets in the
extant literature are tree-like i.e. two diverging paths are not allowed to meet
again afterwards, namely the relevant position poset (P,≤) is required to satisfy
the following
(Tree property for a poset (Q,5)) For any p ∈ Q the p-generated principal
order ideal p5 ↓ = {q ∈ P : q ≤ p} is a chain i.e. q ≤ q0 or q0 ≤ q for any
q,q0 ∈ p5 ↓ .Now, it is immediately checked that while megf uea need not be tree-like,
megf lea do automatically satisfy the tree property. Therefore, one may deﬁne
tree-like megf ueas -denoted megf tueas- by requiring that (P,≤) satisfy the tree
property.
The relationship between game forms of type megf lea and megf tuea as mere
objects -i.e. when no non-trivial notion of ‘structure-preserving map’ is singled
out- is best expressed in terms of the relationships between the corresponding
discrete categories,n a m e l y
Proposition 1 Let Megflea and Megftuea denote the classes of all megflea and
all megftuea as deﬁned above, respectively. Then C (Megfuea) is (isomorphic
to) a full subcategory of C(Megflea ).
Proof. Let Γ =( N,X,P,≤,p 0,λ,ξ,h) be a megf tuea . Then, posit Ai(Γ)=
{(p,q):p ∈ λ
−1{i} and q ∈ UC(P,≤)(p)} (where UC(P,≤)(.)denotes the upper
cover correspondence of (P,≤) i.e. for any u ∈ P,UC(P,≤)(u)={q ∈ P : u<q
and u ≤ r<qimplies u = r})f o re a c hi ∈ N, A(Γ)=
S
i Ai(Γ) and P(Γ)=
{π ∈ A(Γ)≤ω :there exists q ∈ UC(P,≤)(p0) such that π1 =( p0,q) and for
all k if πk =( pk−1,p k) then pk ∈ UC(P,≤)(pk−1).Therefore, it is immediately
checked that the resulting tuple Γ∗ =( N,X,(Ai(Γ))i∈N,P(Γ),v (Γ),p 0,ξ,h)
is indeed a megf lea. Finally, observe that a megf lea Γ is implicitly endowed
with a well-deﬁned move-assignment rule λΓ (namely, for any p ∈ P \ maxv P,
λΓ(p)={S ⊆ N :there exists a =( ai)i∈S ∈
Q
i∈S Ai such that p∗a ∈ P}), and
that by deﬁnition λΓ∗ = λ .
Extensive game forms with labelled or unlabelled moves and almost perfect
information obtain from their multi-extensive counterparts by allowing only one
coalition to move at any non-terminal position. Thus, we have the following
Deﬁnition 3 An extensive game form with labelled moves, exits, and almost
perfect information (egflea) is a megflea Γ =( N,X,(Ai)i∈N,P,v,e,ξ,h) such
that





Deﬁnition 4 An extensive game form with unlabelled moves, exits, and almost
perfect information (egfuea) is a megfuea Γ =( N,X,P,≤,p 0,λ,ξ,h) such that
λ is a single-valued correspondence.
The following proposition is immediately established
Proposition 2 Let Egflea denote the class of all egfleagame forms and Egfuea
the class of all egfuea game forms. Then C(Egflea) is a full subcategory of C
(Megflea ) and C(Egfuea) is a full subcategory of C(Megfuea).Again, one may deﬁne egf tueas on a tree by requiring that (P,≤) satisfy the
tree property.
Moreover, for each of the foregoing extensive formats both a perfect in-
formation and an imperfect information counterpart may be deﬁned. Perfect
information extensive formats obtain from their corresponding almost perfect
information formats by requiring that at any position only single players be
allowed to move.
For instance, we have the following
Deﬁnition 5 A multi-extensive game form with labelled moves, exits, and per-
fect information (megflep) is a megflea Γ =( N,X,(Ai)i∈N,P,v,e,ξ,h) such
that




Deﬁnition 6 An extensive game form on a tree with unlabelled moves, exits,
and perfect information (egftuep) is an egftuea Γ =( N,X,P,≤,p 0,λ,ξ,h) such
that λ(P \ PT) ⊆ {{i} : i ∈ N}.
Again, denoting Megflep and Megftuep the class of all megf lep and the class
of all megf tuep, respectively, we have the following
Proposition 3 C (Megflep) is a full subcategory of C(Megflea), and C(Egftuep)
is a full subcategory of C(Egfuea) (hence, modulo isomorphisms, a full subcate-
gory of C(Megflea) as well).
Tokens of other extensive game formats such as megftup,megftlp, egflp,egfup
are deﬁned similarly, and the corresponding discrete categories are -modulo
isomorphisms- full subcategories of C(Megflea).
Remark 1 T h eg a m ef o r m si n t r o d u c e db yC o n w a yi nh i sc l a s s i cb o o k( s e eC o n -
way (2001)) are 2-player megftueps without exits i.e. with ξ = ∅.T h e y a r e
however not characteristic of mainstream game-theoretic literature, where game
forms of type egftupand egflp without exits are by far the most widely employed:
see Osborne and Rubinstein(1994) where a further closure condition is imposed
on the position set of an egflp Γ =( N,X,(Ai)i∈N,P,v,e,h) to the eﬀect that
as t r e a mw h o s e( ﬁnite) preﬁxes are all admissible positions should also be an
admissible position, namely
(·) for any p ∈ Aω,i fq ∈ P for all q ∈ A∗ such that q v p then p ∈ P.
Extensive formats with imperfect information are meant to represent inabil-
ity on the part of some players to observe or recollect previous moves. This is
typically done by deﬁning for each player a partition of those positions where
the former is allowed to move, perhaps as a member of a certain coalition: any
cell of the partition collects a maximal set of positions that the relevant player is
unable to distinguish from each other (but see Thompson(1952) for a slightly dif-
ferent presentation of extensive game forms with imperfect information, whereplayers are simply identiﬁed with their sets of moves). However, non-partitional
information structures have also been occasionally considered in the extant lit-
erature: in such a case, coverings with possibly intersecting cells -rather than
partitions-of the set of positions attached to any player are usually speciﬁed.
For each of the extensive formats presented above both an imperfect informa-
tion (if no simultaneous moves are allowed) and a strictly imperfect information
(if simultaneous moves are allowed) counterparts may be deﬁned. As an example
we shall consider the following
Deﬁnition 7 A multi-extensive game form with labelled moves, exits, and gen-
eral strictly imperfect information (megflesi)is a tuple
Γ∗ =(N,X,(Ai)i∈N,P,v,e,ξ,h,(=i)i∈N)
where Γ ≡ ( N,X,(Ai)i∈N,P,v,e,ξ,h) is a megflea and
for any i ∈ N, =i = {=i1,..,=ik} is a covering of λ
−1
Γ ({i}) such that
for each =ih, h =1 ,..,k and all p,p0 ∈ =ih
{a ∈ Ai :( p ∗ a) ∈ P} = {a ∈ Ai :( p ∗ a0) ∈ P}
and its more common extensive counterpart with unlabelled moves no exits
and partitional imperfect information, namely
Deﬁnition 8 An extensive game form with unlabelled moves and partitional
imperfect information (megfupi) is a tuple
Γ∗ =( N,X,P,≤,p 0,λ,h,(=i)i∈N)
such that Γ ≡ ( N,X,P,≤,p 0,λ,h) is an egfua and
for any i ∈ N, =i = {=i1,..,=iki} is a partition of λ
−1({i}) such that
for each =ih, h =1 ,..,ki and all p,p0 ∈ =ih
{q ∈ P : q ∈ UC(P,≤)(p)} = {q ∈ P : q ∈ UC(P,≤)(p0))}
where UC(P,≤)(.) denotes the upper cover correspondence of (P,≤) i.e. for
any p ∈ P,
UC(P,≤)(p)={q ∈ P : p<qand p ≤ r<qimplies p = r}.
It transpires that discrete categories of imperfect information game forms
may be regarded as concrete categories over discrete categories of almost perfect
or perfect information game forms. In particular, the following holds:
Proposition 4 Let C(Meglesi) (C(Eg), respectively) denote the class of all megflesi(of
all eglesi, respectively). Then i) C(Megflesi) is a concrete category over C(Megflea).Similarly,
ii)C(Egflesi) is a concrete category over C(Egflea).
Proof. Straightforward: the underlying functor of C(Megflesi) is the function
that sends each megf lesi Γ∗ =( N,X,P,≤,p 0,λ,h,(=i)i∈N) to Γ ≡ ( N,X,P,≤
,p 0,λ,h) i.e. the functor that forgets the information structure (=i)i∈N. Such
a functor is trivially faithful because for any Γ1,Γ2 ∈ Megflesi,
#hom C(Megflesi)(Γ1,Γ2) ≤ 1. As for C(Egflesi) just consider the restriction
of the previous function to Egflesi.
As mentioned above, games obtain from game forms by supplementing the
latter with behavioural information concerning the evaluation of outcomes on thepart of the players. More often than not, the relevant behavioural evaluation-
structure amounts to a proﬁle of binary preference relations that are taken to
be (at least) preorders. However, more general formats for outcome-evaluations
may be- and are indeed sometimes- considered, including (proﬁles of) general
choice functions on the outcome set, namely deﬂationary operators on ℘(X)
i.e. functions C : ℘(X) → ℘(X) such that C(A) ⊆ A for any A ⊆ X.
Again, for each type of game form as described above a corresponding class
of games obtains. We provide just a pair of examples, namely the most nat-
ural common generalization of the several extensive formats for games which
occasionally employed in the literature:
Deﬁnition 9 A multi-extensive game with labelled moves, exits, general strictly
imperfect information and choice evaluation structure (meglesic) is a tuple
Γ∗ =(N,X,(Ai)i∈N,P,v,e,ξ,h,(=i)i∈N,(Ci)i∈N)
where Γ ≡ ( N,X,(Ai)i∈N,P,v,e,ξ,h,(=i)i∈N) is a megflesi and
Ci : ℘(X) → ℘(X) denotes the choice function of player i, i =1 ,..,n
and a version of the most widely used format
Deﬁnition 10 An extensive game with unlabelled moves, partitional imperfect
information and standard preference evaluation structure (egupisp) is a tuple
Γ∗ =( N,X,P,≤,p 0,λ,h,(=i)i∈N,(<i)i∈N)
such that Γ ≡ ( N,X,P,≤,p 0,λ,h) is an egfup,
for any i ∈ N, =i = {=i1,..,=iki} is a partition of λ
−1({i}) such that
for each =ih, h =1 ,..,ki and all p,p0 ∈ =ih
{q ∈ P : q ∈ UC(P,≤)(p)} = {q ∈ P : q ∈ UC(P,≤)(p0))}
where UC(P,≤)(.) denotes the upper cover correspondence of (P,≤) as de-
ﬁned
above, and
<i⊆ X × X is a preorder, that denotes the preference relation of player i,
i =1 ,..,n
It is easily checked that discrete categories of multi-extensive games and
extensive games as deﬁned above are also concrete categories over C(Megflea)
or some of its subcategories. In particular, we have the following
Proposition 5 Let Meglesic (Eglesic, respectively) denote the class of all meglesic(egflesic,
respectively ). Then, i) C(Meglesic) is a concrete category over C(Megflea).Similarly,
ii)C(Eglesic) is a concrete category over C(Egflea).
Proof. Take as an underlying functor the function that sends each meglesic
Γ∗ =( N,X,(Ai)i∈N,P,v,e,ξ,h,(=i)i∈N,(Ci)i∈N) to Γ =(N,X,(Ai)i∈N,P,v
,e,ξ,h) (and its restriction to Eglesic, respectively).
Since similar results hold for each of the relevant extensive formats consid-
ered above -including in particular those one obtains by taking C(Megfuea) andC(Egfuea) as basic categories, one may conclude that to the extent that no non-
trivial notion of morphism is considered virtually all extensive game formats can
be regarded either as full subcategories of C(Megflea) (or C(Megfuea)) or as con-
crete categories over a suitable full subcategory of C(Megflea) (or C(Megfuea)).
Moreover, if multi-extensive game forms are ignored, a similar result obtains for
C(Egflea) and C(Egfuea).
3.2 Strategic formats
In strategic formats the sequential structure of moves is ignored. Indeed, we
have the following
Deﬁnition 11 A strategic game form (sgf) is a tuple
G =( N,X,(Si)i∈N,h) where
N is a set, that denotes the player set
X is a set, that denotes the outcome set




i∈N Si → X is a surjective function, that denotes the outcome function
Remark 2 An alternative ‘contracted’ presentation of a sgf G is the following:
G =( N,(Si)i∈N)
where N and (Si)i∈N are as in the previous deﬁnition.









In a strategic game form any possible combination of strategies is admis-
sible. However, in some notable applications including some classic general
equilibrium existence theorems the feasibility of a certain strategy is taken to
be dependent on the strategies chosen by other players. This sort of situation
can be represented by means of generalized strategic game forms, namely
Deﬁnition 12 A generalized strategic game form (gsgf) is a tuple
G =( N,X,(Si)i∈N,(Fi)i∈N,h)
where N,X,(Si)i∈S denote the player set, the outcome set, and the strategy
sets, respectively, as deﬁned above for sgfs, while
Fi :
Q
i∈N Si →→ Si is a correspondence that denotes the feasibility corre-
spondence of player i, for each i ∈ N, and
h :
Q
i∈N Si  Xis a surjective partial function which is deﬁned on s ∈ Q
i∈N Si if and only if s ∈
Q
i∈N Fi(s), and denotes the outcome function.
It is easily checked that the following proposition holds:
Proposition 6 Let Gsgf denote the class of all gsgf and Sgf the class of all
sgf.T h e n ,C(Sgf) is (isomorphic to) a full subcategory of C(Gsgf).Proof. For all G =( N,X,(Si)i∈N,h) positF(G)=( N,X,(Si)i∈N,(FG
i )i∈N,h)
where for any s ∈
Q
i∈N Si and any i ∈ N, FG
i (s)=Si and F(idG)=idF(G).
Of course, strategic games and generalized strategic games result from sgf s
and gsgf s, respectively, by supplementing them with a suitable outcome evalu-
ation structure i.e. either a proﬁle of choice functions or a proﬁle of preference
relations on X. As an example, consider the following deﬁnition
Deﬁnition 13 A strategic game with standard preference evaluation structure
(sgsp) is a tuple
G =( N,X,(Si)i∈N,h,(<i)i∈N)
where (N,X,(Si)i∈N,h) is a sgf and (<i)i∈N is a proﬁle of preorders on X.
Strategic games with choice evaluation structure (sgcs), and generalized
strategic games with choice evaluation structure or with standard preference
evaluation structure (gsgspsa n dgsgcs) are deﬁned in a similar way. All of them
may be construed as concrete categories over C(Gsgf).
Remark 3 Occasionally, nondeterministic strategic game forms -and games-
have also been considered (see e.g. Otten, Borm, Storcken and Tijs (1995)).
Indeed, a nondeterministic strategic game form amounts to a tuple
G =( N,X,(Si)i∈N,ˆ h ) with N,X,(Si)i∈N deﬁned as for a sgf and
ˆ h :
Q
i∈N Si → ℘(X).
Nondeterministic generalized strategic game forms may then also be deﬁned
in the obvious way. As for nondeterministic (generalized) strategic games they
require that the relevant outcome-evaluation structure be deﬁned on ℘(X) rather
than on the outcome set X.
In particular the following proposition holds
Proposition 7 Let Sgsp,Sgc,Gsg sp,Gsg c denote the class of all sgsp,the class
of all sgc,the class of all gsgsp, and the class of all gsgc, respectively. Then,
i) Sgsp and Sgc are concrete categories over C(Sgf); ii) Gsgsp and Gsgc are
concrete categories over C(Gsgf).
Proof. Straightforward: in each case, take as an underlying functor the
functor that forgets the relevant evaluation structure.
Moreover, extensive game forms and games may be regarded as discrete
subcategories of strategic game forms and games. In particular,
Proposition 8 C(Egflea) is (isomorphic to) a full subcategory of C(Sgf).
Proof. Let Γ =( N,X,(Ai)i∈N,P,v,e,ξ,h) ∈ Egflea.T h e n p o s i t F(Γ)=
(N,X,(Si(Γ))i∈N,h Γ) where for any i ∈ N,Si(Γ)=
½
σi : σi ∈ Aλ−1({i}) is a function such that




and p(σ) ∈ PT denotes the terminal position induced by strategy proﬁle σ =
(σ1,..,σn),f o re a c hσ ∈
Q
i∈N Si(Γ).
The relationship between multi-extensive formats and strategic formats is
more complex since a multi-extensive game form may generate indeed several
strategic game forms. Thus, we shall not pursue it any further in the present
paper.
3.3 Coalitional formats
Under a coalitional format actions or strategies are ignored, and the focus is on
what outcome-subsets or events each coalition is able to enforce.
Let us consider the following
Deﬁnition 14 An eﬀectivity-coalitional game form (ecgf) is a tuple
E =( N,X,E) where
N is a set, that denotes the player set
X is a set, that denotes the outcome set
E : ℘(N) → ℘(℘(X)) is a function, the (generalized) eﬀectivity function
Remark 4 Generalized eﬀectivity functions as mentioned above correspond to
eﬀectivity functions as deﬁned e.g. in Gurvich (1992). In common usage, how-
ever, eﬀectivity functions are usually required to obey a few restrictions (see e.g.
Moulin,Peleg(1982), Abdou,Keiding(1991)). Namely, given a player set N and
an outcome set X,a neﬀectivity function (EF) is usually deﬁned as a function
E : P(N) → P(P(X)) such that EF i) E(∅)=∅ ; EF ii) ∅ / ∈ E(S) for any
S ⊆ N; EF iii) X ∈ E(S) for any S ⊆ N,S 6= ∅;E Fi v )E(N)=P(X)\{∅}.
It should also be emphasized that (generalized) eﬀectivity functions accom-
modate eﬀectivity functions over a restricted domain D ⊆ ℘(N) by positing
E(S)=∅ whenever S ∈ ℘(N) \ D.
Remark 5 An EF E is said to satisfy:
X-Monotonicity if for any A,B ⊆ X and any S ⊆ N : A ∈ E(S) and A ⊆ B
imply B ∈ E(S)
N-Monotonicity if for any A ⊆ X,and any S,T ⊆ N : A ∈ E(S) and S ⊆ T
imply A ∈ E(T)
Superadditivity if for any A,B ⊆ X,S,T ⊆ N, A ∈ E(S),B ∈ E(T) and
S ∩ T = ∅ imply A ∩ B ∈ E(S ∪ T)
Maximality if for any A ⊆ X,S ⊆ N, A / ∈ E(S) only if there exists B ⊆ X
such that B ∈ E(N\S) and A ∩ B = ∅
Moreover, an EF is said to be strategically playable if it can be regarded as
the α−eﬀectivity function (or the β−EF of a strategic game form :see e.g. Pe-
leg(1984), Abdou,Keiding(1991)). This requires that the EF under consideration
satisfy X-Monotonicity, N-Monotonicity and Superadditivity (or Maximality,
respectively).Example 1 A conditional EF can also be deﬁn e db yc o n s i d e r i n gaf u n c t i o n
E0 : P(N) →
Q
x∈X[{x}×P(P(X))] such that for any S ⊆ N , E0(S)= Q
x∈X {x}×Ex(S) where —for each x ∈ X— Ex deﬁnes an EF (see e.g. Rosenthal
(1972) for an early proposal of a special case of that notion). Clearly enough,
(conditional) characteristic function coalitional game forms may be regarded as
corestrictions of (conditional) EFs to singleton-set-values. Moreover, it should
be recalled here that simple games may be regarded as equivalence classes of
simple EFs n a m e l yE F sw i t has e tW ⊆ P(N) such that for any S ∈ P(N)\{∅} :
E(S)=P(X)\{∅} if S ∈ W and E(S)={X} otherwise.
Several weakenings and extensions of EFs have also been proposed in the
literature under various labels: e.g. well-behaved functions satisfying EF i),EF
ii), EFiii), pseudo-EFs or semi-well-behaved functions((see e.g. Ichiishi(1989))
satisfying EF i) and EF ii), or even an intermediate notion of weak EFs satisfying
EF i), EF ii) plus EF iii’) X ∈ E(S) for any S ⊆ N such that E(S) 6= ∅ and
EF iv’) E(N) ⊇ E(S) for any S ⊆ N.
Remark 6 In the last few years some‘new’ coalitional game formats that in
fact amount to families of certain EF-like coalitional game forms have been
introduced in the literature. Thus, an eﬀectivity structure (as deﬁned in Abdou
and Keiding(2002)) is a tuple
E∗[.]=( N,X,(Ex)x∈X) where for any x ∈ X
Ex ⊆ (℘(X))N is a set of functions Ex : N → ℘(X) such that there exists
i ∈ N with Ex(i) 6= ∅, and Ex is an order ﬁlter of the poset ((℘(X))N,⊇∗) where
⊇∗ denotes the component-wise set-inclusion partial order. Clearly enough, a
canonical injection f mappimg the foregoing functions into EFs may be deﬁned
by the following rule. For each x ∈ X,a n de a c hEx ∈ Ex : f(Ex)(S)=
{A ⊆ X : A ⊇∩ i∈SEx(i)} for any S ⊆ N. But then, it is easily checked that an
eﬀectivity structure may be regarded as a family of (generalized) EFs. Similarly,
constitutional game forms as presented in Andjiga and Moulen (1989), and
dynamic eﬀectivity functions as introduced in Pauly (2001) amount to certain
families of EFs.
A quite diﬀerent coalitional game format is deﬁned as follows
Deﬁnition 15 A social situation form (ssf) is a tuple
S =( N,X,I)
where
N is a set, that denotes the player set,
X is a set, that denotes the outcome set
I ⊆ P(N,X) × ℘(N) × X × P(N,X)
-where P(N,X)=℘(N) × ℘(X) denotes the set of position-forms on
(N,X)- is a correspondence such that
I ⊆ {((S,A),U,x,(T,B)) : x ∈ A,U ⊆ S,U ⊆ T},and denotes the induce-
ment correspondence (see e.g. Greenberg(1990)).
It can be shown that eﬀectivity-coalitional game forms amount to a special
case of social situation forms, namelyProposition 9 Let Ecgf denote the class of all eﬀectivity-coalitional game
forms and Ssf the class of all social situation forms. Then, C(Ecgf) is (iso-
morphic to) a full subcategory of C(Ssf).
Proof. For each E =( N,X,E) ∈ Ecgf, posit F(E)=( N,X,I(E)) where
I(E)={((T,B),S,x,(U,A)) : T = N,B = X,x ∈ X,S = U,A ∈ E(S)}
Again, coalitional games in several diﬀerent formats obtain by supplementing
the corresponding coalitional formats as deﬁned above with a suitable outcome-
evaluation structure i.e. with proﬁles of preference relations or choice functions
on the outcome set. Thus, one may deﬁne
Deﬁnition 16 An eﬀectivity-coalitional game with preference evaluation struc-
ture (ecgp) (with choice evaluation structure (ecgc), respectively) is a tuple
G =( N,X,E,(<i)i∈N )
where (N,X,E) is an ecgf
and (<i)i∈N is a proﬁle of preorders on X
(at u p l eG =( N,X,E,(Ci)i∈N)
where (N,X,E) is an ecgf
and (Ci)i∈N,C i : ℘(X) → ℘(X), i =1 ,..,n
is a proﬁle of choice functions on X, respectively).
Similarly, one has social situations with preference evaluation structure and
social situations with choice evaluation structure as deﬁned below
Deﬁnition 17 A social situation with preference evaluation structure (ssp) is
at u p l e
(N,X,I,(<i)i∈N)
where (N,X,I) is a ssf and
and (<i)i∈N is a proﬁle of preorders on X.
Similarly, a social situation with choice evaluation structure (ssc) is a tuple
(N,X,I,(Ci)i∈N)
where (N,X,I) is a ssf and
and (Ci)i∈N is a proﬁle of choice functions on X
Again, it is immediately checked that the classes of all eﬀectivity-coalitional
games and of all social situations may be construed as concrete categories over
eﬀectivity-coalitional game forms and social situations forms, namely
Proposition 10 i) Let Ecgp denote the class of all ecgp,a n dEcgc the class of
all ecgc. Then both C(Ecgp) and C(Ecgc) are concrete categories over C(Ecgf).
ii) Let Ssp denote the class of all ssp, and Ssc the class of all ssc. Then both
C(Ssp) and C(Ssc) are concrete categories over C(Ssf).
Moreover, it can be shown that virtually all coalitional formats that are
currently employed -or have been indeed ever proposed- in the game-theoretic
literature can be regarded as versions of the foregoing formats (see e.g. Van-
nucci(2001) for a discussion of this point, and more examples).4C h u s p a c e s
Let A be a category with ﬁnite products, and K ∈ Ob(A). Then a (A-
enriched) Chu space over K is a tuple A =( X,Y,a) where X,Y ∈ Ob(A)
and a∈ homA(X × Y,K).
Let A =( X,Y,a) and A0 =( X0,Y0,a0) be A-enriched Chu spaces over
K.A Chu-transform from A to A0 is a pair ϕ =( f,g) of A-morphisms f ∈
homA(X,X0),g∈ homA(Y 0,Y) such that a0 ◦(f × idY 0)= a ◦(idX × g).
The following proposition is easily established (see e.g. Barr and Wells (1995)
for a more general version of that result and Pratt(1995,1999) for a general
discussion)
Proposition 11 Let A be a category with ﬁnite products, and K ∈ Ob(A).Then,
consider the tuple Chu(A,K)=( O,hom,id,◦) where O is the class of all A-
enriched Chu spaces, hom(A,A0) is the set of all Chu transforms from A to
A0 for any A,A0 ∈ O, idA =( idA
X,id A
Y ) for each A =( X,Y,a) ∈ O, and
ϕ0◦ϕ =( f0◦Af,g◦Ag0) for any pair of Chu transforms ϕ =( f,g) ∈ hom(A,A0)
and ϕ0 =( f0,g0) ∈ hom(A0,A00). Then Chu(A,K) is a category.
In particular, the following corollary holds
Corollary 12 Let Poset be the category having the class of all ordered sets
as objects and the class of order-homomorphisms as morphisms, K as e ta n d
b K =( K,=).T h e nChu(Poset, b K) is a category.
Henceforth we shall indulge to a slight abuse of notation and write Chu(Poset,K)
for Chu(Poset, b K) since no ambiguity may arise from that usage.
As mentioned above in the Introduction, it has been observed that the cat-
egory Chu(Set,2) is isomorphic to a category of 2-player strictly competitive
strategic games (see e.g. Lafont and Streicher(1991)). Indeed, Chu(Set,2) is
also isomorphic to a category of 2-player 2-outcome strategic game forms. How-
ever, the objects of the foregoing categories only comprise a very specialized
subclass of games or game forms. What, then, about other game forms and
games? Are all of them representable in a natural way within a more general
category than Chu(Set,2)?
The rest of this section is devoted to showing that in fact: i) all the discrete
categories of game forms and of games introduced in Section 3 may be either em-
bedded in Chu(Poset,2) or construed as concrete categories over some suitable
subcategory of Chu(Poset,2), and ii) for a suitable speciﬁcation of morphisms
the resulting categories of game forms and of games are either full subcategories
of Chu(Poset,2) or concrete categories over some suitable full subcategory of
Chu(Poset,2).
To begin with, let us consider the following embeddings of the relevant dis-
crete categories of game forms deﬁned above into Chu(Poset,2) :Proposition 13 i) C(Megflea) is (isomorphic to) a nonfull subcategory of Chu(Poset,2);
ii) C(Gsgf) is (isomorphic to) a nonfull subcategory of Chu(Poset,2);
iii) C(Ssf) is (isomorphic to) a nonfull subcategory of Chu(Poset,2).
Proof. i) For any Γ =(N,X,(Ai)i∈N,P,v,e,ξ,h) ∈ Megflea take F(Γ)=
((℘(N) × gr(h),=),(P,v),a)
where gr(h)={(q,x) ∈ P × X : x = h(q)}
and for any S ∈ ℘(N),(q,x) ∈ gr(h),p∈ P :
a (S,(q,x),p)=1if either there exist p0 ∈ PT,a=( ai)i∈S ∈
Q
i∈S Ai such
that p∗a ∈ P, p∗a v p0 and h(p0)=x,o rt h e r ee x i s t si ∈ S such that p = ξ(i)
and h(p)=x,a n da ((S,x),p)=0otherwise.
Moreover, posit F(idΓ)=idF(Γ).
Clearly -by deﬁnition, and by idempotency of the identity function- F is
a well-deﬁned functor from C(Megflea) to Chu(Poset,2).Also, F is trivially
faithful since C(Megflea) is a discrete category. Moreover, F is injective on
objects: if Γ,Γ0 ∈ Megflea and F(Γ)=F(Γ0) then, by deﬁnition of F (and
by deﬁnition of a megf lea), Γ 6= Γ0 only if ξ(Γ) 6= ξ(Γ0).Let us then assume
that ξ(Γ) 6= ξ(Γ0). Hence there exists (i,p) ∈ N × P such that either [ξ(Γ)(i)=
p 6= ξ(Γ0)(i)] or [ξ(Γ0)(i)=p 6= ξ(Γ)(i)]. Suppose w.l.o.g.that ξ(Γ)(i)=p 6=
ξ(Γ0)(i) holds. Then p ∈ dom(h(Γ)).Now, take x = h(Γ)(p): it follows that
aF(Γ0) ({i},(p,x),p)= aF(Γ) ({i},(p,x),p)=1whence there must exist p0 ∈ PT
and a ∈ Ai such that p ∗ a ∈ P,p ∗ a v p0 and h(Γ0)(p0)=x, a contradiction
since h(Γ)=h(Γ0) and h(Γ0)(PT) ∩ h(Γ0)(ξ(N)) = ∅.
Finally, F is obviously nonfull: to check this, consider any pair (X,≤),(Y,≤0)
of posets with X 6= Y a n da n yC h ut r a n s f o r m(f,g) from Chu space A =
((X,≤),(X,≤),a) to Chu space A0 =( ( Y,≤0),(Y,≤0),a0). Clearly, there is no
Γ ∈ Megflea such that (f,g)=F(idΓ).
ii) For any G =( N,X,(Si)i∈N,(Fi)i∈N,h) ∈ Gsgf take
F(G)=( ( N×
Q




a ((i,s),x)=1if h(s)=x and a ((i,s),x)=0otherwise, and posit
F(idG)=idF(G).
Again, it is immediately checked that F is a well-deﬁned faithful functor from
C(Gsgf) to Chu(Poset,2).To see that F is also injective on objects, hence an
embedding of categories, consider any pair G,G0 ∈ Gsgf such that F(G)=
F(G0). If G 6= G0 then it must be the case that h(G) 6= h(G0) i.e. there
exists (s,x) ∈
Q
i∈N Si × X such that either [h(G)(s)=x 6= h(G0)(s)] or
[h(G)(s) 6= x = h(G0)(s)]. Let us suppose w.l.o.g. that [h(G)(s)=x 6= h(G0)(s)]
holds.
But then, for any i ∈ N
aF(G) ((i,s),x)=1while aF(G0) ((i,s),x)=0i.e. aF(G)6=aF(G0), a contra-
diction since F(G)=F(G0).
Nonfullness of F follows from the same argument introduced under i).
iii) For any S =(N,X,I) ∈ Ssf posit
F(G)=( ( ℘(N) × ℘(X) × X × ℘(N),=),(℘(N) × ℘(X),c),a)
where for any (S,A),(T,B) ∈ ℘(N) × ℘(X),(S,A) c (T,B) iﬀ [S ⊇ T and A ⊇ B],w h i l e
a ((S,A,x,U),(T,B)) = 1 if ((S,A),x,U,(T,B)) ∈ I and a ((S,A),(T,B)) =
0 otherwise. Moreover, take
F(idS)=idF(S).
Now, F is by deﬁnition a well-deﬁned functor, and is faithful by discrete-
ness of C(Ssf) . To see that it is also injective on objects, consider any
pair S,S0 ∈ Ssf such that F(S)= F(S
0) and S 6= S
0.Then there exists a tuple
((S,A),U,x,(T,B)) ∈ (I(S) \I(S0))∪(I(S0) \I(S)).Let us assume w.l.o.g. that
((S,A),U,x,(T,B)) ∈ I(S)\I(S0).It follows that aF(S) ((S,A,x,U),(T,B)) = 1
while aF(S0) ((S,A,x,U),(T,B)) = 0, a contradiction.
Finally, F is nonfull by the same argument presented above under i).
Therefore, one may indeed conclude that-at least when only identity mor-
phisms are considered- virtually all game forms or games may be regarded either
as subcategories of Chu(Poset,2)or as concrete categories over subcategories
of Chu(Poset,2).
Of course, one should like to know if for some reasonable choice of mor-
phisms of game forms the latter may be represented as full subcategories of
Chu(Poset,2). The following proposition provides a (partially) positive an-
swer to that question, namely
Proposition 14 Let Ecgf
∗ =( Ecgf,homEcgf∗,id,◦) where for any E =( N,X,E),E0 =
(M,Y,E0) ∈ Ecgf,
homEcgf∗(E,E0)={(f,g):f ∈ homPoset((℘(N),⊇),(℘(M),⊇))
g ∈ homPoset((℘(Y ),⊇),(℘(X),⊇)) such that
for each S ⊆ N and each B ⊆ Y
B ∈ E0(f(S)) iﬀ g(B) ∈ E(S)}.
Then, Ecgf
∗is a full subcategory of Chu(Poset,2).
Proof. It is immediately checked that Ecgf
∗is a well-deﬁned category.
Next, for any E =( N,X,E),E0 =( M,Y,E0) ∈ Ecgf,a n da n yφ =( f,g) ∈
homEcgf∗(E,E0) posit F(E)=( ( ℘(X),⊇),(℘(Y ),⊇),aE),w h e r ef o ra l lS ⊆
N,A ⊆ X, aE (S,A)=1if A ∈ E(S) and aE (S,A)=0otherwise, and
F(φ)=φ.
Clearly, F is -by deﬁnition- a functor from Ecgf
∗to Chu(Poset,2).
Moreover, F is trivially faithful and full, by deﬁnition. To see that F
is also injective on objects, hence an embedding, notice that for any E =
(N,X,E),E0 =( M,Y,E0) ∈ Ecgf,i fF(E)=F(E0) and E 6= E0 then neces-
sarily N = M, X = Y and E 6= E0 i.e. there exist S ⊆ N,A ⊆ X such that
either [A ∈ E(S) \ E0(S)] or [A ∈ E0(S) \ E(S)]. In any case, it follows that
aE6= aE0, a contradiction.
It should be noticed that the foregoing result might be extended to all
classes of game forms whose corresponding discrete categories are subcategories
of C(Ecgf), by deﬁning morphisms in such a way that they preserve the relevanteﬀectivity-coalitional structure. The details however, will not be pursued here.
I also conjecture that a similar result could be established for social situation
forms, but I leave this issue as a topic for further research.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The present paper has been to a large extent a tour de force among game
formats. By establishing that virtually all of them may be represented as sub-
categories (or even full subcategories) of the category Chu(Poset,2) of Poset-
enriched Chu spaces over 2, the results provided above help make three main
points, namely:
i) given the remarkable variety of extant game formats, reducing them to
special versions of an underlying common structure is only possible if the latter
is indeed a very general one;
ii) the category Chu(Poset,2) seems to be a better candidate for that role
than Chu(Set,2),which has also been proposed in the literature as a good
representation of (certain) games and game forms;
iii) as a result, the family of Chu(Poset,K) categories as indexed by the
class of all sets are arguably a better candidate as a tool for representing and
classifying the objects of mathematical discourse than the corresponding family
of Chu(Set,K) categories as proposed in Pratt(1995). This observation is
reinforced by the fact that for any K, Chu(Set,K) may be construed as a full
subcategory of Chu(Poset,K). It should also be remarked that the results
of the present paper suggest that suitably fuzziﬁed versions of game formats
inhabit the categories Chu(Poset,K).
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